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020			_a9781849504430 (electronic bk.) : _c�70.95 ; �100.95 ; $128.95
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050		4	_aKF1600 _b.R47 2007
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072		7	_aLAW000000 _2bisacsh
072		7	_aBUS069000 _2bisacsh
080			_a339
082	0	4	_a340 _222
245	0	0	_aResearch in law and economics _h[electronic resource] : _ba journal of policy / _cedited by Richard O. Zerbe, John B. Kirkwood.
260			_aBingley, U.K. : _bEmerald, _c2007.
300			_a1 online resource (257 p.).
490	1		_aResearch in law and economics, _x0193-5895 ; _vv. 22
505	0		_aLays vs. wages : contracting in the klondike gold rush / Douglas W. Allen -- Buyer power : economic theory and antitrust policy / Zhiqi Chen -- Generalized critical loss for market definition / Malcolm B. Coate, Mark D. Williams -- Price-fixing overcharges : legal and economic evidence / John M. Connor -- Predatory price cutting and standard oil : a re-examination of the trial record / James A. Dalton, Louis Esposito -- On the optimal negligence standard in tort law when one party is a long-run and the other a short-run player / Henrik Lando -- Should victims of exposure to a toxic substance have an independent claim for medical monitoring? / Thomas J. Miceli, Kathleen Segerson -- Market concentration, multi-market participation and antitrust / Dennis L. Weisman.
520			_aWritten by leading experts in the field, each chapter in this book examines in depth a topic in law and economics. John Connor begins by describing and evaluating the results of his extensive survey of reports of cartel overcharges. Dennis Weisman models the price effects of mergers that not only increase concentration in the relevant market but also increase the merged firms' participation in other, complementary markets. Malcolm Coate and Mark Williams develop a superior method for calculating critical loss in markets that are relatively homogenous and competitive premerger. Zhiqi Chen surveys recent developments in economic theories of buyer power and creates a general framework for antitrust analysis. Finally Thomas J. Miceli and Kathern Segerson, given the difficulty of collecting damages after a long latency period, examine the desirability of granting toxic exposure victims an independent cause of action for medical monitoring at the time of exposure. They show that such a cause of action increase incentives for injurer care but only at the cost of greater litigation cost and the reluctance of courts to adopt such a proposed cause of action reflect their awareness of this trade-off.
588	0		_aPrint version record
650		7	_aLaw _xGeneral. _2bisacsh
650		7	_aBusiness & Economics _xEconomics _xGeneral. _2bisacsh
650		7	_aJurisprudence & philosophy of law. _2bicssc
650		7	_aEconomic theory & philosophy. _2bicssc
650		0	_aTrade regulation _zUnited States.
700	1		_aZerbe, Richard O.
700	1		_aKirkwood, John B.
776	1		_z9780762313488
830		0	_aResearch in law and Economics ; _vv. 22.
856	4	0	_uhttps://www.emerald.com/insight/publication/doi/10.1016/S0193-5895(2007)22
913			_1BMEbacklist
999			_c524212 _d524147