Moral realism as a moral doctrine / Matthew H. Kramer.
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Item type | Current library | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode |
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Mysore University Main Library | Not for loan | EBJW1040 |
Includes bibliographical references (pages 365-374) and index.
Introduction -- Mind-independence -- Determinate correctness -- Uniform applicability -- Invariance -- Transindividual concurrence -- Impartiality -- Truth-aptitude -- Further dimensions of ethical objectivity? -- Supervenience as an ethical phenomenon.
In this major new work, Matthew Kramer seeks to establish two main conclusions. On the one hand, moral requirements are strongly objective. On the other hand, the objectivity of ethics is itself an ethical matter that rests primarily on ethical considerations. Moral realism - the doctrine that morality is indeed objective - is a moral doctrine.:.; Major new volume in our new series New Directions in Ethics.; Takes on the big picture - defending the objectivity of ethics whilst rejecting the grounds of much of the existing debate between realists and anti-realists.; Cuts across both ethical the.
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